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Non-Practicing Entities & Patent Reform 
 




The patent system is designed to promote innovation and 
supply a blueprint for innovative minds to improve upon, but the 
behavior of some patent owners is contrary to these principles.  
Non-practicing entities obtain patent rights, and rather than 
produce the product claimed in the patent, they assert their 
exclusionary rights broadly and aggressively against businesses 
producing similar products in order to induce settlement or 
licensing payments.  These assertions account for a significant 
percentage of infringement claims and threaten a potentially 
innocent business with expensive litigation.  The actions of these 
entities have a substantial effect on the patent system and have 
been the motivation behind reform and recent Supreme Court 
decisions.  Each of the three branches of government has 
significant influence over the patent system, and each has the 
potential to promote change to reduce the impact of non-
practicing entities on the United States patent system and on the 
United States economy. 
 
I. Introduction to The Patent System and Non-Practicing 
Entities 
 
It could not be argued otherwise that the purpose of the 
patent is to promote the progress of science and useful arts, for 
the words come from our highest legal authority, The United 
States Constitution.1  To an inventor, a patent means security.  
Patents provide a safeguard for inventors, protecting their right 
to their own product and incentivizing continued innovation.  
Absent the safety of a patent, an inventor without capital has 
nothing more than an idea ready to be seized by a capable 
company.  Who would continue in the advancement of science 
and technology if their life’s work could be swept away by anyone 
 
1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
1
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with their ear to the door?  Patents work to remove inventions 
from the shadows of laboratories and promote disclosure so that 
one’s ideas may be built upon by another’s ideas.  The spirit of 
the patent is embodied in the quote by Isaac Newton in a letter 
addressed to Robert Hooke: “If I have seen further, it is by 
standing on the shoulders of giants.”2 
An issued patent in compliance with statutory requirements 
provides the owner, and his heirs or assigns, with “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale . . . or 
importing” the patented subject matter.3  A patent owner may 
bring an action in district court against a party whose product is 
claimed to infringe against the rights of the owner.  While a 
patent approved by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”) is presumed to be valid, in court, a defendant 
in an infringement suit may defend or counter with a claim of 
invalidity.4  A patent may be held invalid if the subject matter is 
found unpatentable, if the invention is obvious, or if the 
invention lacks novelty under the statute.5  Since infringement 
suits require extensive time and money, the USPTO provides 
several proceedings that may be initiated following the grant of 
a patent that are designed to settle such disputes. These post-
grant proceedings were expanded in the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”).6 
The AIA brought substantial reform to United States patent 
law.7  Some of the most significant changes were to the 
procedure for contesting the validity of a third party’s patent.  
Prior to the implementation of the AIA, a third party could 
assert invalidity in three ways: as a defense to an infringement 
suit; petition for inter partes reexamination; or file for ex parte 
 
2.  Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (on file with 
author), https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/objects/9792. 
3.  35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (2012). 
4.  35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). A patent may be held invalid if it is found that 
the subject matter is unpatentable, if the invention is obvious or lacks novelty, 
or if the invention fails to demonstrate utility under the statute. See infra note 
5. 
5.  35 U.S.C. § 101-03 (2012). 
6.  See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
7.  Id. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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reexamination with the USPTO.8  Ex parte reexamination 
proceedings involve only the patent owner and the USPTO, 
giving the petitioning party limited opportunity to assert his or 
her case.9  Inter partes reexamination was instituted in the 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 and allowed for third 
party participation, but was overhauled by the AIA in 201110  
The AIA created new alternatives for a party to contest the 
validity of another party’s patent. These alternatives are known 
as inter partes review (“IPR”) and post-grant review.11 
IPR is an adversarial proceeding within the USPTO, which 
is brought by a third party who contests the validity of another 
party’s patent.12  IPR takes place before a panel of three 
Administrative Patent Judges of the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (“PTAB”).13  The petition is limited to contesting the 
patent under the statutory novelty or obviousness standards.14  
The petitioning party must identify existing patents or printed 
publications that raise a question of the patent’s validity.15  
 
8.  Jason Scott Tiedeman & Eric D. Gorman, Declaratory Judgement 
Actions, Covenants Not to Sue, and Bad Patents: A Call to Allow the Judiciary 
to Weed Out Bad Patents while Adhering to the “Case or Controversy” 
Requirement, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 22-26, 41 (2012). 
9.  Id. at 29. 
10.  Id. at 26-27. One of the most significant changes brought by the AIA 
was the changing of the standard used to grant a review of a patent.  The AIA 
lowered the review from “a substantial new question of patentability” to “‘a 
reasonable likelihood that’ the challenger ‘would prevail.’” Cuozzo Speed 
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016); compare 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) 
(2006) (repealed), with 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). 
11.  Tiedeman & Gorman, supra note 8, at 27. Post-grant review is an 
adversarial proceeding that became available after March 2013 with the 
implementation of the AIA.  Post-grant review differs from IPR in the legal 
standard required for a showing of invalidity, in order for the USPTO to grant 
review.  Post-grant review has the higher legal standard, as a petitioner must 
show that “it is more likely than not” that the proceeding will result in the 
cancellation of one or more of the patent claims.  IPR requires the petitioner to 
show that there is a reasonable likelihood of success that one or more of the 
claims are anticipated by the prior art.  Post-grant review, therefore, requires 
a showing of a 51% or greater chance of success while IPR encompasses 50% 
or greater.  Id. at 40, 74. 
12.  See generally 35 U.S.C. § 311-19 (2012). 
13.  PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01356-EJD, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4095, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014). 
14.  35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
15.  35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)(A) (2012).  This is yet another way in which post-
grant review differs from inter partes review; patents being reviewed post-
3
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Additionally, the petition must be brought at the conclusion of 
post-grant review within nine months of the grant of the patent 
or within one year of the commencement of an infringement 
suit.16 
The purpose of IPR was to “establish a more efficient and 
streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and 
limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”17  It 
seeks to accomplish this goal by expeditiously resolving issues 
within one year of the granting of IPR, and providing estoppel 
on the issue of invalidity of patent claims during litigation in 
federal court.18 Additionally, the process works to remove bad 
patents and promote valid patents through contests by third 
parties.19  Because of this, courts will often stay proceedings 
pending the outcome of IPR.20  Recent statistics in 2013 show 
that courts stay proceedings across the country at a rate of 
approximately sixty percent when an IPR decision is pending.21  
Some of the benefits of staying the proceeding include the 
examination of the patent by experienced patent judges, the 
potential reduction in arguable factors at trial, judicial 
efficiency, and possible dismissal if the patent is held invalid by 
the PTAB judges.22 Avoiding costly litigation and having the 
benefit of experienced patent judges are not the only benefits of 
choosing IPR; there are several fundamental differences 
between IPR and district court procedures that influence the 
outcome for parties wishing to contest the validity of another’s 
 
grant may be argued invalid on much broader grounds.  Compare 35 U.S.C. 
§ 321 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
16.  35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1)-(2) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012). 
17.  Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant 
Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method 
Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680-01 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 
(2017)). 
18.  PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01356-EJD, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4095, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014). 
19.  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (citing 
157 Cᴏɴɢ. Rᴇᴄ. 9778 (2011) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte)). 
20.  See id. at 2146.  
21.  Robert Arcamona & David Cavanaugh, Stays to Litigation Pending 
IPR and CBM Review: Statistics, Trends, and Key Issues, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, 
Mar. 2014, at 9, https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/ 
Editorial/Publications/Documents/IP-today-stays-to-litigation-pending.pdf.  
22.  Mathew R. Frontz, Staying Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review 
and the Effects on Patent Litigation, 24 Fᴇᴅ. CIR. B.J. 469, 472-73 (2015). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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patent. 
The procedure of IPR and district court proceedings differ 
substantially.  In IPR, the parties have the option, although 
rarely granted, of amending or modifying their claims.23  
Conversely, in district court, there is no such option.24  
Additionally, case schedules between the two approaches can 
differ drastically; district court procedures and patent trials may 
take several years, while IPR is statutorily mandated to be 
completed within one year of commencement.25 The procedures 
also differ in the absence of summary judgment in IPR, absence 
of a jury at a PTAB hearing, limitation of issues to patentability 
in IPR,26 restrictions on witness testimony in IPR, and 
settlement practices.27  Furthermore, discovery procedures vary 
drastically; in district court, discovery is broadly available, while 
in IPR, discovery is limited to routine discovery and a significant 
showing of relevancy and appropriateness of the discovery 
requests must be presented to the Board for additional 
discovery.28  Lastly, judgments from each may be appealed to the 
Federal Circuit, although the standards of review on appeal 
differ depending on which legal avenue was utilized.29  District 
court decisions are reviewed for clear error while PTAB decisions 
are reviewed for substantial evidence.30  These differences in 
procedure influence a party’s decision to pursue a claim in 
district court and/or to pursue a determination of validity via 
IPR. 
 
23.  Michael J. Flibbert & Maureen D. Queler, 5 Distinctions Between 
IPRs and District Court Patent Litigation, Fɪɴɴᴇɢᴀɴ (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=64c22ef
3-9abe-4637-a445-c75c56892eb1. 
24.  Id. 
25.  37 C.F.R § 42.100(c) (2017). 
26.  Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23. A district court may hear a variety 
of issues including infringement, damages, misuse, etc., but IPR is limited to 
the patentability of the claims under novelty and obviousness standards.  37 
C.F.R. § 42.104(2) (2017) (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2012)).  
27.  Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23.  
28.  Id.; compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), with 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b) (2017). 
29.  Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23. 
30.  Id.; Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ.’s Embrace of PTAB to Fuel More AIA 
Reviews, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
767549/fed-circ-s-embrace-of-ptab-to-fuel-more-aia-reviews (board decision 
affirmance rates are quite high as a result of a more deferential standard of 
review for PTAB decisions). 
5
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There are several fundamental differences between IPR and 
district court review that also have had an influence on the rate 
of patents being held invalid in IPR proceedings.  One difference 
is that, in IPR, the legal standard of review is the preponderance 
of the evidence test, while district courts use the clear and 
convincing test.31  Clear and convincing evidence is “the highest 
burden of proof in U.S. civil litigation” and provides a 
presumption of validity of patents being contested in court.32  In 
proceedings involving PTAB judges, no presumption of validity 
exists, and the patent may be invalidated under a finding of 
invalidity by preponderance of the evidence.33  This fundamental 
difference is discussed later as a potential area for patent 
reform.34  Another difference is the standard for claim 
construction.  The PTAB judges utilize the “broadest reasonable 
construction standard” while the federal courts must view the 
claim’s explicit language and its meaning to a person having 
“ordinary skill in the art.”35 
The two analytical procedures that are employed by the 
separate entities may result in a different claim meaning, 
depending on who is reviewing the patent.  There are several 
instances where both the district court and PTAB have 
participated in claim construction for the same claims, but it is 
fairly rare under the AIA amendments, due to courts frequently 
staying proceedings during IPR review.36  In cases where both 
entities have reviewed the patent, there are several instances in 
which the PTAB judges have reached the same claim 
construction as the district court,37 and several cases in which 
 
31.  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Dep’t of Com., MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 706 (9th ed. 2018). “In other words, an examiner 
should reject a claim if, in view of the prior art and evidence of record, it is 
more likely than not that the claim is unpatentable” Id.; See also Cuozzo Speed 
Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016). 
32.  Flibbert & Queler, supra note 23. 
33.  Id.  
34.  See infra Section III.  
35.  Jacob Oyloe et al., Claim Constructions in PTAB vs. District Court, 
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2014, 10:50 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/581715/ 
claim-constructions-in-ptab-vs-district-court. See also Cuozzo Speed Techs., 
LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2134 (2016) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  
36.  Oyloe et al., supra note 35. 
37.  Id.; see, e.g., Google Inc. v. SimpleAir, Inc., No. CBM2014-00054, 2014 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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they have differed,38 as a product of the differing analyses.39  
Because of the lower burden of proof required in IPR for a patent 
to be held invalid, PTAB judges have shown a pattern of 
invalidation of patents at a substantially high rate, giving PTAB 
judges the nickname “patent death squads.”40  “The PTAB has 
invalidated at least ‘one claim’ –or part—in almost 80% of the 
patents it has ruled on,” after the implementation of the AIA.41  
This seemingly anti-patent bias sparked discussion of the 
potential effect of the PTAB invalidations stifling innovation and 
creating a barrier to obtaining and maintaining legitimate 
patents.42  PTAB practice was further criticized after entities 
began to abuse the system for financial gain.43 
The structure of IPR coupled with the relentless 
invalidation of patent claims by PTAB judges created a system 
that could be exploited by those with capital.  Kyle Bass, a hedge-
fund manager, is one of the well-known exploiters of the 
system.44  Mr. Bass has challenged the validity of several 
pharmaceutical patents using his Coalition for Affordable 
Drugs, with the intention that they would be invalidated by the 
PTAB.45  Entities like Mr. Bass’s Coalition then see a profit by 
betting against the pharmaceutical company’s stock value, and 
if they are successful in contesting the patent’s validity, the 
company can see a value decline of up to ten percent in its 
shares.46  Mr. Bass claims that his actions help to reduce 
artificial inflation of drug prices by challenging the patents, but 
 
WL 1940194 (P.T.A.B. May 13, 2014); Kyocera Corp. Motorola Mobility LLC v. 
Softview LLC, No. IPR2013-00004, 2014 WL 1382058 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014). 
38.  Oyloe et al., supra note 35; see, e.g., Rackspace Hosting, Inc. v. 
Rotatable Techs., No. IPR2013-00248, 2013 WL 8595952 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 
2013); Vibrant Media, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. IPR2013-00170 (JYC), 2013 
WL 8595515 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 2013). 
39.  Oyloe et al., supra note 35. 
40.  Peter J. Pitts, ‘Patent Death Squads’ vs. Innovation, WALL ST. J. (June 
10, 2015, 7:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/patent-death-squads-vs-
innovation-1433978591. 
41.  Id. (citing Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An 
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 101 (2014)). 
42.  See Pitts, supra note 40. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, Kyle Bass Takes Aim at Drug 
Patents, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2015, at B1. 
46.  Id.; Pitts, supra note 40. 
7
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many believe his goal is a selfish one and that he is taking 
advantage of the patent system for his own financial gain.47  
Evidence supporting the latter is the fact that Mr. Bass had 
teamed up with a known non-practicing entity, Erich 
Spangenberg, who has a history of exploiting the patent system 
for financial gain.48  Non-practicing entities are a thorn in the 
side of legitimate business, and have created issues that are 
driving the need for patent reform. 
Non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) are individuals or 
companies who acquire patent rights from an inventor or owner 
of a patent.49  NPEs are also referred to as patent assertion 
entities (“PAE”) and pejoratively as patent trolls.50  NPEs do not 
produce the patented invention, rather, they make a profit by 
aggressively asserting their patent rights over others with newly 
obtained patents.  Viewed in a positive light, NPEs allow small 
and medium sized patent holders to make a profit by 
relinquishing some or all of their rights to their patented 
invention in exchange for an opportunity to enforce their patents 
over potential infringers vicariously through the NPEs.51  
However, these functions may be secondary to their personal 
financial gain, for the money obtained in settlement of the suits 
by the NPEs is not returned to the inventors, rather, it is shared 
only with the NPE’s attorney as contingency fees.52 
NPEs have been under much scrutiny for alleged abuses of 
the patent system and for acting contrary to the fundamental 
policies of patent rights. NPEs do not produce any products 
 
47.  Walker, supra note 36.  
48.  Id. 
49.  David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-
Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 425-26 (2014) 
(stating that non-practicing entities are often referred to as “patent trolls” or 
“patent assertion entities”). 
50.  Bʀɪᴀɴ T. Yᴇʜ & Eᴍɪʟʏ M. Lᴀɴᴢᴀ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,  
PATENT LITIGATION REFORM LEGISLATION IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 5 (2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43979.pdf. The name patent troll is derived 
from the villains of folklore which would sit surreptitiously under a bridge that 
they did not build and demand tolls from travelers attempting to cross. Id. The 
comparison is derived from the fact that NPEs did not invent or produce the 
patented product but still demand monetary compensation for others to use it. 
Id.  
51.  Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 49, at 428. 
52.  Id. at 429.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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themselves, rather, they make their profits through aggressively 
asserting their patent rights.53  This is frequently done in an 
unreasonably broad manner to coerce often innocent, alleged 
infringers to license under the NPE’s patent or to force a court 
settlement in which the NPE’s profit.54  They take advantage of 
the broad claim construction of their patents to cast a wide net 
over an industry and pull into court anything they claim falls 
under their patent.55  Federal lawsuits are enormously 
expensive, and by threatening suit against valid producers, they 
often force licensing or payment of fees that are substantially 
less than the cost of litigation.56  As the Chairman and President 
of the Licensing Executives Society, Brian O’Shaughnessy 
stated, “[t]he whole point of the system is to encourage 
invention, but if it’s impossible to enforce your rights without 
going bankrupt, that’s not much encouragement[.]”57  How can 
NPE practice be said to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts when they do not produce any scientific or useful 
product, yet they hoard the patents which claim the rights to 
those products and syphon money from entities which are 
promoting innovation? 
 
II. The Judicial Branch: NPEs in Court 
 
In 2012, it was estimated that up to sixty-one percent of new 
patent lawsuits were brought by NPEs (also known as PAEs) 
and the potential cost of these suits was approximated at 
 
53.  Shwartz & Kesan, supra note 49, at 429. 
54.  See BRIAN T. YEH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 5 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R42668.pdf. 
55.  Id. at Summary.  
56.  YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 5. NPEs extort the producers by 
threatening litigation; additionally, they utilize the International Trade 
Commission to threaten to block importation to extort a greater value from the 
potential defendant.  Kurt Orzeck, Reps. Reintroduce Bill to Keep Patent Trolls 
Out of ITC, LAW360 (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:23 PM), http://www.law360.com 
/articles/775112/reps-reintroduce-bill-to-keep-patent-trolls-out-of-itc. A 
potential remedy is being sought through the proposed Trade Protection, Not 
Troll Protection Act.  See H.R. 4829, 114th Cong. (2016).  
57.  Erin Coe, Patent Owners Face Tougher Playing Field as Obama Exits, 
LAW360 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/873350/patent-
owners-face-tougher-playing-field-as-obama-exits. 
9
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twenty-nine billion dollars in 2011.58  Of these lawsuits, it was 
shown through a random sample of patent cases, that 325 cases 
settled with the majority of NPE suits never reaching trial or 
summary judgment.59  According to another study, NPEs engage 
in considerably more lawsuits than their product-producing 
counterparts, but also have a substantially lower chance of 
winning if the case proceeds to trial.60  This accounts for the 
extraordinarily high settlement rate of NPEs at 89.6% of cases.61  
NPEs rely on these suits to profit, so they must be diligent in 
choosing which entities to pursue in court, for if the party 
asserted against has the means to see the case to the end, they 
have a higher chance of winning.  With NPEs maintaining their 
presence in the years following the implementation of the 
America Invents Act,62 the courts have produced a handful of 
influential decisions limiting the abuse of NPEs. 
A significant limitation was placed on NPEs in the Supreme 
Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, which vastly 
limited the ability of patent trolls to receive injunctive relief.63  
The case involved a “business method patent” owned by 
MercExchange “designed to facilitate the sale of goods by 
establishing a central authority to promote trust among 
participants.”64  The court outlined a four-factor test for the 
appropriateness of injunctive relief, addressing (1) irreparable 
 
58.  Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, SANTA CLARA U. slide 23 
(Dec. 10, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314; 
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014). 
59.  Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 375-77, 
385 (2012) (stating that the cases sampled were from 2007 to 2011 and showed 
an increase in NPE lawsuits from 22% to 40% over the time period). 
60.  John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat 
Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 692-94 (2011) (stating NPEs win judgments 
on the merits in 9.2% of cases compared to 50% for product producing wins). 
61.  Id. at 694. 
62.  While there may have been a decrease in lawsuits brought by NPEs 
in 2011, in 2013, after the implementation of the America Invents Act, NPEs 
still accounted for an estimated 52% of all patent infringement suits. James 
Bessen, Patent Trolling was Up 11 Percent Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/patent 
-trolling-was-up-11-percent-last-year/. 
63.  See generally 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
64.  Id. at 390. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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injury; (2) inadequacy of other remedies; (3) balancing of the 
hardships of both parties; and (4) the public interest.65  While 
the Supreme Court stated that NPEs are not disqualified from 
injunctive relief per se, courts have since consistently weighed 
the factors against NPEs for injunctive relief.66  Furthermore, 
following the decision in eBay, NPEs have had a rather difficult 
time demonstrating “irreparable” harm when they have no 
intentions of producing their patented subject matter.67  By 
effectively removing the ability of NPEs to obtain injunctive 
relief, eBay has limited their awards to monetary damages, and 
has prevented NPEs from completely shutting down the 
operations of producers in court. 
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Breyer in 2015, 
the Supreme Court in Cuozzo empowered the USPTO and 
validated its regulation of its agency proceedings.68  The case 
involved a patent for a speedometer that showed the driver when 
they were driving in excess of the speed limit.69  The plaintiffs 
were a group of NPEs who sought to alter the procedure of inter 
partes review by invalidating the broadest reasonable 
construction standard in favor of a standard more favorable to 
the patent holders.70  This was an attempt to establish an 
appealable standard which would give a presumption of validity 
to a plaintiff’s patent in IPR, hence creating an analogous 
standard to the one used in district court.71  The NPEs argued 
 
65.  Id. at 391.  
66.  Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation 
After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1987-90 (2016) 
(demonstrating that NPEs were only 16% successful in obtaining an injunction 
following a finding of liability, while other patentees were 80% successful in 
obtaining injunctions); see, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007); Lamina Packing Innovations, LLC v. Monsieur Touton Selection, 
Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 5039(CM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51020 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 
2013); Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Comput. Inc., No. 06-cv-462-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38220 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010). 
67.  See Seaman, supra note 66, at 1952-53.  
68.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
69.  Id. at 2138. 
70.  Joe Mullin, Supreme Court sends off patent troll that challenged 
review rules with an 8-0 slapdown, ARSTECHNICA (June 23, 2016), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/06/how-a-patent-troll-brought-its-
color-shifting-speedometer-to-the-supreme-court/.  
71.  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2134-35.  
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that the agency lacked authority to use its own standard of 
review.72  In his decision, Justice Breyer analogized IPR with a 
“specialized agency proceeding” rather than a judicial decision.73  
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the USPTO has the 
authority under case law (Chevron and Mead) to regulate its own 
proceedings and fill in any gaps or ambiguities in the 
Congressional statutes.74  The upholding of the USPTO’s 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard has allowed the 
agency to be critical of overly broad patents, and has aided in the 
identification, management, and invalidation of such patents 
that NPEs collect and enforce. 
A persistent judicial exploitation that NPEs often utilized 
was a method of forum shopping.  Given the legal freedom to do 
so, an asserting party would often choose to bring its case in a 
district that is known for its patent-owner-friendly decisions.75  
Although there are specific statutes governing venue in patent 
cases, in 1990 the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of venue 
in VE Holding Corp. to “any district where there would be 
personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant at the time 
the action is commenced.”76  This decision led to valid 
determinations of jurisdiction in any state which the patented 
product or allegedly infringing product was sold.  Because of 
this, historically, the Eastern District of Texas received “20-25% 
of all patent litigation.”77  The Supreme Court recently decided 
a case which involved this very type of venue shopping. 
 
72.  Id. at 2142.  
73.  Id. at 2135. 
74.  Id. at 2144 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 
(2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984)). 
75.  Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Patent Venue Case Filled 
with Patent Reform Implications, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2016), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/14/supreme-court-patent-venue-case-
patent-reform-implications/id=75751/; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c)(2), 1400(b) 
(2012). The statutes regarding proper venue are 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which 
states that a “patent infringement [action] may be brought in the judicial 
district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed 
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business[,]” and 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), which states that a corporation is a resident of a district 
“in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction . . . .”  
76.  VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 
(Fed. Cir. 1990).  For the applicable statutes, see supra note 90.  
77.  Quinn, supra note 74.  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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The recent TC Heartland v. Kraft has the potential to reduce 
the instances of venue shopping in patent infringement cases.78  
The patent infringement suit was brought by Kraft over its Mio 
water enhancers, and Kraft advocated for the case to be heard 
in Delaware, a patent-friendly venue.79  The fundamental 
question to be determined in the case was the meaning of the 
term “residence” as applied to corporate entities asserting 
patent rights in jurisdictions outside of their state of 
incorporation.80 The Supreme Court held that “[a]s applied to 
domestic corporations, ‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the 
State of Incorporation.”81  Going forward, in the context of NPEs 
that are not incorporated in the forum state, venue contests will 
now turn upon the satisfaction of a “regular and established 
place of business” under § 1400(b),82 which is a more 
comprehensive test.83 
One of the most significant patent cases to be tried before 
the Supreme Court since the implementation of the AIA was 
Alice v. CLS Bank.84  In Alice, the Court addressed patentable 
subject matter restrictions under 35 U.S.C. § 101.85  While 
abstract ideas, such as mathematical equations, remain outside 
of the realm of patentable subject matter, some entities were 
acquiring broad and vague patents on such ideas by claiming the 
idea through the use of a computer.  The patents at issue in Alice 
claimed “(1) a method for exchanging financial obligations, (2) a 
computer system configured to carry out the method for 
exchanging obligations, and (3) a computer-readable medium 
containing program code for performing the method of 
 
78.  TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 
(2017).  
79.  See id. at 1517.  
80.  Id. at 1516-17. 
81.  Id. at 1521. 
82.  28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).  
83.  See In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2017). (the 
Federal Circuit has established a three-part test for an entity to satisfy a 
regular and established place of business within the forum under §1400(b): the 
entity must have (1) a physical presence in the forum (2) that is regular and 
established (not sporadic), and (3) is the place of the business and not solely 
the place of an employee).  
84.  See generally 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  
85.  Id. at 2352; see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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exchanging obligations.”86  In deciding the case, the Court relied 
heavily on Mayo, which provides the framework for the section 
101 claims at issue.87  The case resulted in the invalidation of 
the abstract subject matter patents, referred to as business 
method patents, and began a trend of invalidation of such 
patents in the USPTO.88  Such patents were very valuable to 
NPEs because of their ability to enforce their patents against a 
wide range of potential infringers due to their broad reach and 
commonly utilized subject matter.  Although Alice may have 
created just as much confusion as clarification over the 
boundaries of patentable subject matter in the software 
industry, it functioned to halt attempts of enforcement by NPEs 
holding business method patents and render them invalid in 
USPTO proceedings. 
A recent decision by Judge Cote in the Southern District of 
New York ordered an unusual remedy in a patent infringement 
suit involving NPEs with business method patents.89  The case 
involved AlphaCap Ventures, an NPE, suing ten companies over 
infringement of its business method patent over financing data 
collection.90 The NPE, unsurprisingly, sued each entity in the 
Eastern District of Texas, and each party settled except Gust, 
who transferred the case to New York and raised its own claims 
of abuse of process and patent misuse against AlphaCap.91  In 
her strongly-worded decision, Judge Cote stated that the NPEs 
were aware of the invalidation of their patents by the Alice 
decision, yet commenced the suits anyway.92  She stated that the 
commencement of the suit, knowing the patents were 
 
86.  Id. at 2349. 
87.  Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78-80 (2012)). When addressing the patentability of claims 
that involve laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas the court 
must: (1) determine whether the claims involve one of these concepts; (2) 
determine if there are additional elements that transform the claim into a 
patentable combination. Id. 
88.  Nam Kim, Software and Business Method Inventions After Alice, 
INTELL. PROP. L. BLOG (Sep. 23, 2016), https://www.intellectualpropertylaw 
blog.com/archives/software-and-business-method-inventions-after-alice.  
89.  See Gust, Inc. v. AlphaCap Ventures, LLC, No. 15cv6192 (DLC), 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98869 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2016).  
90.  Id. at *1-2.  
 91.   Id. at *3-5.  
 92.   Id. at *4. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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invalidated, was frivolous and awarded over $500,000 in 
attorney’s fees against the NPE.93  The decision became unusual 
when the Judge ordered the NPE as well as its counsel, Gutride 
Safier LLP to pay the fees for the frivolous suit.94  The decision 
to make the attorneys for the NPE responsible for the payment 
of the fees sets up an interesting situation for future NPEs like 
AlphaCap.  If attorneys can be personally held to pay the 
opposing counsel’s fees for bringing a lawsuit asserting an 
overly-broad patent, they may very well be dissuaded from 
representing NPEs at all.  This decision, if adhered to, may have 
the future effect of forcing NPEs to choose their lawsuits much 
more carefully in order to secure counsel for the matter.  While 
federal courts have strategically limited the abuses of NPEs, the 
legislative branch has been developing reform that would 
constitute much more broad and immediate changes to the 
patent system. 
 
III. The Legislative Branch: Proposed Reform 
 
A recent change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”) dealt a blow to the non-practicing entities’ legal 
arsenal.  In December of 2015, the FRCP was amended and Rule 
84 was abrogated.95  Rule 84 provided an abbreviated complaint 
template, Form 18, which exempted patent infringement 
complaints from the standards set in Twombly and Iqbal.96  
Prior to the amendment, patent infringement complaints only 
needed to provide basic factual allegations, while the standard 
outside of Rule 84 was plausibility.97  This allowed NPEs to 
assert a valid claim without any substantial factual allegations, 
making their threats of suit even more likely.  It is argued that 
 
 93.  Ryan Davis, NPE, Gutride Safier Ordered to Pay Up in ‘Frivolous’ 
Suit, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2016, 10:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
874955/npe-gutride-safier-ordered-to-pay-up-in-frivolous-suit. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Fᴇᴅ. R. Cɪᴠ. P. 84. 
 96.  Dennis Crouch, An Early Review of the Impact of Form 18’s 
Elimination on Pleading Direct Infringement, PATENTLYO (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://patentlyo. com/patent/2016/04/elimination-pleading-infringement.html. 
See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 97.  Id. 
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the limited requirements encouraged NPEs to “intitiate 
frivolous lawsuits” whose pleadings would not meet the general 
standard.98  Additionally, the lack of information supplied in the 
initial pleadings would result in lengthier discovery and slow 
and costly lawsuits.99  The amendments were too recent to 
provide any substantial evidence of their effect on NPEs, but 
courts have already begun to require stricter standards on 
patent infringement complaints.100  In addition to requiring 
stricter standards for pleadings, there are several proposed bills 
in Congress that would have a substantial impact on the abuses 
of NPEs in the patent system. 
One of the most expansive proposed patent reform bills was 
the Innovation Act.  The Innovation Act was introduced by 
Representative Goodlatte in February, 2015.101  The first 
ambition of the act was to clarify the level of detail required in 
the pleadings of an infringement suit, relating to the lower 
acceptable standard prior to the abrogation of the Form 18 
pleadings.102  The bill would require the complaint to allege in 
detail the patented invention allegedly infringed upon, the 
elements of the specific claims infringed, the specific acts of the 
infringer along with a detailed description of the infringing 
instrumentality, and the authority of the party to assert the 
action against Defendant.103  Additionally, the complaint must 
identify all entities that have a financial interest and any parent 
company and licensee of the plaintiff, which ties into the second 
objective of the bill.104 
 
 98.  YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 8. 
 99.  H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 22-23 (2013). 
 100.  See, e.g., InCom Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., No. CV15-3011, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71319, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016); Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 
10x Genomics, Inc., No. 15-152-RGA, 2016 US. Dist. LEXIS 33875, *6-7 (D. 
Del. Mar. 4, 2016). 
 101.  Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 102.  Id. § 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (abrogated, effective3 Dec. 1, 2015). 
 103.  Id. The Senate proposed Protecting American Talent and 
Entrepreneurship Act, (PATENT Act), which outlines very similar 
requirements for pleadings in infringement lawsuits.  A clear difference 
between the bills is that the PATENT Act does not require the description of 
the authority to bring suit within the pleading, but requires specific 
information to be disclosed within fourteen days after service or filing.  S.1137, 
114th Cong. § 281B(b) (2015). 
 104.  H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 114-235, at 5 (2015). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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The second purpose of the Act was to allow for the joinder of 
parties with an interest in the suit.105  The bill allowed for a 
party other than the party alleging infringement to be joined 
when that party: 
 
(A) is an assignee of the patent or patents at issue; 
(B) has a right, including a contingent right, to  
enforce or sublicense the patent or patents at 
issue; or 
(C) has a direct financial interest in the patent or 
patents at issue, including the right to any part of 
an award of damages or any part of licensing 
revenue . . . .106 
 
The significance of this proposition is to create transparency 
as to which entities have a financial interest in the lawsuit, and 
which larger entities may be the controlling party over the 
ownership of the patent rights.  NPEs have, in the past, set up 
elaborate chains of shell companies making it difficult to legally 
reach the ultimate entity in charge (the entity with the capital).  
If an NPE shell company loses a suit, they may just file for 
bankruptcy for they do not have the capital to pay the fees and 
the deep pocketed parent company is not a party within the suit.  
This provision works to require that parent company to be 
disclosed and mandates them to participate in the suit. 
The third objective of the Act was to limit the cost of 
discovery and to allocate the costs of litigation effectively.  This 
was accomplished by the Act postponing discovery during the 
resolution of pre-trial motions.107  With several exceptions, the 
Act would generally stay discovery pending a motion to sever a 
claim or for misjoinder, a transfer of venue, or a motion to 
dismiss.108  The exceptions include when the court believes 
discovery is necessary to decide a motion, issues involving 
preliminary injunctions, parties’ consent to discovery, and 
 
 105.  Id. at 3-4. 
 106.  Id. at 4. 
107.  YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 9. 
108.  Id. at 9-10.  The PATENT Act allows for limited discovery to resolve 
pre-trial motions, but overall, calls for similar reform as the Innovation Act.  
17
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certain drug product disputes.109  This provision of the Act was 
designed to limit the cost to the parties in litigation by 
eliminating the cost of discovery during the interim of motion 
decisions.  This provision had the potential to work significantly 
against NPEs in lowering the cost of litigation to the infringing 
party and possibly work in favor of avoiding settlement with the 
entity.  At the very least, NPEs would have to reevaluate their 
demands for settlement; when NPEs present an offer of 
settlement they must demand an amount significantly lower 
than the cost of litigation in order to be successful in pressuring 
the defendant to settle.  If similar reform is successful in 
lowering the cost of litigation, it may have the secondary effect 
of lowering the demands of NPEs. 
Section 3 of the Act also proposed shifting the costs of patent 
litigation.110  The Act proposed that the non-prevailing party of 
the patent infringement suit would be liable for reasonable 
attorney’s fees.111  Since the vast majority of NPE suits that do 
not end in settlement are resolved in favor of the allegedly 
infringing party, this could provide substantial reform in 
opposition of NPEs.  This provision increased the risk for NPEs 
to bring a lawsuit and would result in decisions similar to that 
of Judge Cote in AlphaCap Ventures, discussed above.112  
Additionally, in a provision titled “covenant not to sue,” the Act 
called for attorney’s fees for unilateral motions to dismiss.113  
Working in conjunction with the increased pleading 
requirements, a complaint alleging infringement by an NPE 
that is overreaching or unreasonably vague may be dismissed 
along with the requirement of payment of attorney’s fees.  This 
increased risk of dismissal could also dissuade NPEs from 
casting a wide net and aggressively asserting their patent rights 
with broad patent claims at the risk of being dismissed.  
Moreover, if the party cannot pay, a joined party may be 
 
109.  Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
110.  Id.  
111.  Id. (the act outlines an exception to the fees if the non-prevailing 
party’s position and conduct are reasonably justified in law and fact, or for 
special circumstances).  The Senate’s PATENT Act also calls for the payment 
of attorney’s fees if the position or conduct of the asserting party is not 
objectively reasonable.  S.1137, 114th Cong. § 7 (2015).  
112.  See supra Section II. 
113.  Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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responsible for the remainder of the fees.114  Building off of the 
necessary joinder provision of the Act, the organization that is 
ultimately leading these patent enforcers will be held liable for 
whatever damages that its cronies cannot pay. 
The fourth purpose of the Act required the USPTO to 
provide small businesses with information regarding abusive 
patent litigation practices.115  Section 7 of the Innovation Act 
addressed small business education and outreach.116  The 
section would require the USPTO to pursue two initiatives.  The 
first requirement was that the director of the USPTO “shall 
develop educational resources for small businesses to address 
concerns arising from patent infringement.”117  The second 
provision would require “education and awareness [to small 
businesses] on abusive patent litigation practices” and would 
require a dedicated section of the official USPTO website to 
small business education.118  These resources would spread 
awareness of patent troll practice and help prevent NPEs from 
preying on small uninformed businesses.  Receiving an 
unanticipated demand letter from an unknown company 
threatening suit in the absence of a licenses agreement may send 
a small business into panic.  Without capital to defend a suit 
against a seemingly wealthy, successful, patent-owning 
company, a small business may concede immediately to the 
demands without realizing it may have done nothing wrong.  
These programs may have the effect of significantly reducing 
easy targets from the pool of potential NPE victims. 
The Innovation Act also addressed the issue of venue 
shopping discussed in TC Heartland. The proposed provision 
under the Act would permit jurisdiction in a judicial district 
“where the defendant has a principal place of business or is 
 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. § 7.  
116.  Id. Additionally, the proposed PATENT Act also contains a provision 
requiring educational resources to be made available to small businesses. See 
S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 13 (2015). 
117.  H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 114-235, § 7(a)(1), at 12 (2015). 
118.  Id. §§ 7(a)(2), 7(b)(1).  Like the Innovation Act and PATENT Act, the 
STRONG Patents Act address the issue of abusive patent practice on small 
businesses.  The STRONG Patents Act would “require the Small Business 
Administration to produce a report that analyzes the impact of patent 
ownership by small businesses . . . .”  YEH & LANZA, supra note 50, at 36. 
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incorporated[,]” the defendant has infringed and “has a regular 
and established physical facility[,]” the defendant consents to 
jurisdiction, the inventor conducted research, or where a party 
has a psychical facility for a purpose other than creating venue 
in that jurisdiction.119  This provision was, of course, drafted 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland; however, 
the provision had the potential to significantly reduce the ability 
of plaintiffs to travel nationwide to bring an infringement suit in 
a district that is likely to give a favorable decision.  Following 
the TC Heartland decision, venue may no longer be a focus of 
patent reform, but time will tell if further legislative action 
should be taken in reducing a patent plaintiff’s ability to forum 
shop.  Likewise, there may be increased manufacturing and 
research and development coming to the Eastern District of 
Texas in order for businesses to take full advantage of the most 
patent-friendly forum. 
The fifth objective of the Act was to end the practice of bad 
faith demand letters.  Demand letters are sent by the patent 
holding party and typically contain a cease and desist demand 
or a demand that the allegedly infringing party establish a 
license with the patent holder for its product.120  NPEs are often 
associated with the use of vague demand letters “for the sole 
purpose of extracting financial concessions.”121  The act stated 
that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that it is an abuse of the patent 
system and against public policy for a party to send out 
purposefully evasive demand letters to end users alleging patent 
infringement.”122  The bill further stated that demand letters 
must contain “basic information about the patent in question, 
what is being infringed, and how it is being infringed.”123  This 
provides the accused party with adequate information as to the 
legitimacy of the claims and allows the entity to better prepare 
a litigation strategy if they were to choose to defend themselves 
over succumbing to the demands of the NPE. 
There were three additional proposed patent reform bills 
which addressed the issue of abusive demand letters by NPEs.  
 
119.  Id.; Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
120.  YEH & LANZA, supra note 50 at 23.  
121.  Id. at 27.  
122.  H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 114-235, § 281B(e), at 6 (2015). 
123.  Id.  
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/9
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First, the Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015 addressed 
necessary change to the content of demand letters.124  The bill 
would require significant disclosure from the asserting entity of 
patent rights and ownership as well as information on the 
recipients and the history of patent assertion for entities sending 
more than twenty demand letters within a one-year period.125  
Additionally, the bill contained eighteen informational 
requirements that each demand letter must contain. These 
requirements included, but were not limited to, disclosure of 
information on the infringed patent, identification of claims 
infringed, detailed explanation of how the product infringes the 
patent, and information regarding the right of the asserting 
party to bring the patent infringement claim.126  The objective of 
this bill was to eliminate the practice of abusive demand letters 
and to seize one of the legal weapons in the NPE arsenal, which 
is used to coerce allegedly infringing parties into submitting to 
the NPE’s demands. 
The remaining two proposed bills on demand letter reform 
were the Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (“TROL”) Act127 
and the Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s 
Growth (“STRONG”) Patents Act.128  These two bills were 
identical in that they identified abusive demand letter practice 
as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act and 
authorized the FTC to enforce regulation against unfair or 
deceptive demand letters.129  The separate bills outlined several 
instances in which demand letters may be classified as unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices: (1) if a sender of a demand letter acts 
in bad faith regarding the identity of parties or presence of 
current civil action;130 (2) seeks compensation, in bad faith, 
 
124.  See Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 1896, 114th 
Cong. (2015).  
125.  Id. § 2. 
126.  Id. § 3. 
127.  H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. (2015) (TROL is a clever name that plays off 
of a name commonly given to NPEs, patent trolls, and stands for Targeting 
Rogue and Opaque Letters).  
128.  S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015) (STRONG stands for Support Technology 
and Research for Our Nation’s Growth). 
129.  See H.R. 2045, § 2(a), at 3-6; S. 632, § 202(a). 
130.  H.R. 2045, § 2(a)(1); S. 632, §202(a)(1). 
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under an invalid patent,131 or; (3) in bad faith, fails to include 
any of the following information; the identification of asserting 
entities and patent(s) infringed, identification of the infringed 
product, a description of how the product infringes, or the 
contact information for patent holder.132  While the individual 
bills may have differed, they both addressed the need for the 
disclosure of information within the letters of the identity of 
asserting parties, identity of any patents infringed, and, 
specifically, how the patent has been infringed.  These 
fundamental pieces of information allow the alleged infringer to 
seek legal counsel and begin discussing the merits of the 
accusations.  Without such information, and in the current state 
of patent demand letters, the party may be left with insufficient 
information to prepare for litigation and may be confronted by a 
threat which has been made in bad faith to extort a license 
agreement from the party. 
As discussed earlier, a fundamental difference between 
district court patent proceedings and USPTO patent contests is 
the burden of proof required for a showing of invalidity.133  The 
USPTO currently requires the preponderance of the evidence 
standard while the district court requires clear and convincing 
evidence.134  The issue that this creates, aside from general 
inconsistency, is a presumption of patent validity in district 
court and an emergence of anti-patent “death squads” in the 
USPTO.135  While the Innovation Act was silent on the issue, the 
Senate’s PATENT Act sought to establish a presumption of 
claim validity for IPR and post grant review proceedings, while 
maintaining the current standard of preponderance of the 
evidence.136  The STRONG Patents Act, however, sought to 
amend the standard in the USPTO proceedings to mirror that of 
the district court’s standard of proof of clear and convincing 
 
131.  H.R. 2045, § 2(a)(2); S. 632, §202(a)(2). 
132.  H.R. 2045, § 2(a)(3); S. 632, § 202(a)(3). 
133.  See supra Introduction to The Patent System and Non-Practicing 
Entities. 
134.  Id.  
135.  Id.; see Pitts, supra note 40. 
136.  PATENT Act, S.1137, 114th Cong. § 11(b)(3), (1)(J)(2)(E) (2015) (this 
objective to create a universal standard of review between federal court and 
the USPTO is analogous to the argument that the NPEs asserted in Cuozzo 
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)). 
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evidence.137  This had the potential to create uniformity in the 
analyses used by the judicial and administrative entities, but 
more significantly, has the potential to return the PTAB to a pro-
patent institution.  Conversely, as discussed in Cuozzo above, 
the importation of the clear and convincing standard to the 
USPTO post-grant proceedings could potentially make it more 
difficult to invalidate unreasonably broad patents being asserted 
by NPEs. 
Congress has been considering the next round of patent 
reform since the effects of the AIA have become apparent.  The 
AIA did not sufficiently address the abuses of the patent system 
by NPEs, and the results are patently clear.  Potential remedies 
to some of the largest issues are addressed in the proposed bills 
discussed above, but as of the 2016 presidential election, the bills 
have failed to make it out of Congress.  With the transition of 
administrations comes other opportunities for patent reform 
from the executive branch of the United States Government. 
 
IV. The Executive Branch: The Future of Reform 
 
The proposed bills discussed above currently remain in the 
House and Senate with their destinies uncertain.  The Obama 
Administration made significant progress in patent reform with 
the AIA, but President Obama himself admitted that it “only 
went about halfway to where we need to go.”138  With his term 
coming to an end, President Obama was referred to as “the most 
hands-on policy-savvy president in the IP field that we’ve ever 
had[.]”139  With his departure, President Obama has passed on 
the responsibility to see the remaining issues resolved. 
The 2016 election has created a sweeping change in favor of 
the Republican Party, and the proposed patent reform bills have 
historically received mixed support by the Republican Party.140  
 
137.  S. 632, §§ 102(c), 103(c).  
138.  The Obama White House, President Obama Participates in a 
Fireside Hangout on Google+, YᴏᴜTᴜʙᴇ (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=kp_zigxMS-Y. 
139.  Coe, supra note 57.  
140.  See Republican/Conservative, MᴀᴘLɪɢʜᴛ, http://maplight.org/us-
congress/interest/J1100/bills (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (demonstrating 
Republican representatives both supporting and opposing past patent reform 
bills).  
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A revived Innovation Act is not likely to make progress in the 
115th Congress, but it is likely that Senator Chris Coons will 
resubmit the STRONG Act in the coming Congress.141  President 
Trump has remained relatively quiet on the issues of patent 
reform, with the exception of his desire to increase intellectual 
property law enforcement against countries such as China.142  
The Trump Administration calls for the implementation of 
changes on high-priority controversial issues, such as 
immigration bans, wall and pipeline construction, the defeat of 
ISIS, and the refocusing of the Environmental Protection 
Agency.143  With the Administration’s necessary focus on these 
crucial issues, it is likely that patent reform will be, initially, a 
low priority for the Trump Administration.  However, the patent 
landscape is influenced by more than reform bills alone. 
The most significant influence that President Trump will 
have on the patent system, in the absence of priority of reform, 
is his appointments.  The prior Director of the USPTO, Michelle 
Lee was replaced by President Trump during the introduction of 
his Administration with Andrei Iancu.144  The director “sets the 
tone for hiring and promoting administrative judges, examiners, 
and supervisors” which influences the agency’s position and 
enforcement of patent rights.145  Many had speculated as to who 
President Trump’s nomination would be for the position. 
Predictions included Michelle Lee staying as the current 
director, Phil Johnson of Johnson & Johnson, or an individual 
from the pharmaceutical industry, but President Trump had not 
expressed an interest in any particular candidate until August 
 
141.  Russell Binns, Patents Under the Trump Administration, LAW360 
(Jan. 27, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/885572/patents-
under-the-trump-administration. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Miriam Valverde, What Trump has done in his first 100 days in 
office, POLITIFACT (April 16, 2017), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2017/apr/26/what-trump-has-done-his-first-100-days-office/.  
144.  Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Andrei 
Iancu Begins Role as New Director of United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/andrei-
iancu-begins-role-new-director-united-states-patent-and-trademark.  
145.  Steve Hall & Kate Van Namen, The Impact of President Trump’s IP-
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of 2017.146 
Arguably, the most influential appointment comes from 
President Trump’s Supreme Court appointment.  President 
Trump’s nominee, and newest Supreme Court Justice, Neil 
Gorsuch, filled the vacant position left by the late Antonin 
Scalia.147  Gorsuch has not had a decision that enlightens us on 
his stance of the state of the patent system, but he has expressed 
his desire to do-away with Chevron deference.148  Chevron was a 
Supreme Court decision that established a blueprint for 
reviewing courts to give administrative agencies deference on 
particular matters of agency expertise.149  In the absence of 
Chevron, a reviewing court would review a claim de novo, and 
would strip away some of the USPTO’s authority given to it in 
the Cuozzo decision.150 
Removal of Chevron deference would put parties being 
subjected to lawsuits by NPEs at an even greater disadvantage.  
A company defending against an infringement claim by an NPE 
would bring an IPR proceeding to try and reduce the costs of 
litigation, and it would have the benefit of the preponderance of 
the evidence test favoring invalidation of a weak patents.  Then, 
when the NPE’s weak patent is invalidated, it could simply 
appeal to Federal Court, which would no longer have to give any 
deference to the USPTO, nor would it apply the same legal 
standard; rather, the court would apply the clear and convincing 
evidence test, which would favor the validation of the patent, 
and would essentially undo the expert decision of the PTAB. 
 
 
146.  Binns, supra note 125; Gene Quinn, Trump Nominates Andrei Iancu 
to be USPTO Director, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog. 
com/2017/08/26/trump-nominates-andrei-iancu-uspto-director/id=87362/.  
147.  Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neil Gorsuch is Sworn In as Supreme Court 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/ 
politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html. 
148.  Scott Graham, What to Expect From Neil Gorsuch on IP, Patents and 
Trade Secrets, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 13, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.nationallaw 
journal.com/id=1202779049527/What-to-Expect-From-Neil-Gorsuch-on-IP-
Patents-and-Trade-Secrets?slreturn=20170123154805. 
149.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 468 
U.S. 837 (1984). 
150.  Lawrence Ashery, The State of Judicial Deference to the USPTO, 
LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/859781/ 
the-state-of-judicial-deference-to-the-uspto. 
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With Supreme Court patent cases being so influential over 
the past several years, Neil Gorsuch may have a significant 
impact on the future of patent law.  The impact is amplified by 
the possibility of additional Supreme Court appointments 
during Trump’s presidency.  While the outcome of future 
Supreme Court patent decisions are uncertain, what is certain 
is the need for reform in the patent system, the need for the 
promotion of fairness, the need to adhere to the principles of the 
Constitution, and the need for a shield against legitimate 




The patent system was implemented to promote scientific 
and technological advancements and provide inventors with a 
form of protection over their work.  The protections were so 
fundamental that they appear in Article I of the Constitution.  
The accumulation of patent rights by non-practicing entities is 
contrary to these principals.  NPEs abuse the legal system by 
exercising blatant forum shopping, sending abusive and vague 
demand letters, enforcing patents with subject matter that is on 
the fringe of patentability, forcing licensing agreements and 
settlement payments from companies that produce products in 
good faith, hiding behind shell corporations to avoid liability, 
and costing innocent companies millions of dollars in legal fees 
to succeed in litigation.  There is potential to eliminate these 
practices through upcoming Supreme Court decisions, proposed 
legislation in Congress, and new presidential appointments that 
will influence the future of patent reform.  Regardless of the 
governmental avenue, reform is justified for the sake of 
innovation and for the sake of upholding the principles found 
within the United States Constitution. 
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